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Book Reyiew

Euthanasia Examined
John Keown, ed.
Cambridge University Press, 1995, xv, 340
The prevailing wisdom in Europe (with the exception of the
Netherlands) and perhaps North America regarding Euthanasia and its
legalization finds expression, I believe, in the Report of the House of
Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics of 1993-94. 1 The following
seven propositions drawn from that report 2 summarize that wisdom or
strategy:
1) Euthanasia is "the deliberate intervention undertaken with the
express intention of ending life." (Section 18)3 See also Section 20
(99).
In other words, for purposes of legislation euthanasia is
conceived narrowly as voluntary active euthanasia. In this respect there
appears to be little difference between Dutch, English, and American
proposals.
2) Euthanasia thus understood weakens "society's prohibition of
intentional killing" which is the" cornerstone of law and of social
relationships" and "protects each one of us impartially, embodying
the beliefthat all are equal." (Section 237 [102]).
Voluntary passive euthanasia, conceded by almost everyone to
be the moral equivalent of voluntary active euthanasia (since it is the
intentional killing of another person by omission) is left in moral limbo
or permitted and even encouraged under the aegis of the patient's legal
(and, according to some, moral) right to self-determination or
autonomy. Even the prohibition against voluntary active euthanasia is
weakened by recommendations such as that in the Walton report
(section 261) to abolish the mandatory life sentence for murder.
3) Although voluntary active euthanasia may be morally
appropriate in some individual cases and appear to justify some
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modification in the law, a legal policy that would accommodate
these cases would have "serious and widespread repercussions".
(Section 238) One reason for this is that "issues of life and death
do not limit themselves to clear definition, and without that it
would not be possible to frame adequate safeguards against nonvoluntary euthanasia if voluntary euthanasia were to be legalized."
(ibid) Thus it would be "next to impossible to ensure that all acts
of euthanasia were truly voluntary, and that any liberalisation of
the law was not abused." (ibid) Creating a legal exception to the
general prohibition of intentional killing would "inevitably open
the way to its further erosion whether by design, by inadvertence,
or by the human tendency to test the limits of any regulation."
(ibid) If these dangers were to be actualized they would outweigh
any problems that decriminalization sought to address.
According to tIns line of reasoning, voluntary euthanasia is not
always unethical. If a law could be fonnulated that would be so precise
and strict that we could be sure that all the justificatory conditions for
voluntary euthanasia were met, then there could be no objection to
changing the law. Unfortunately, it is extremely doubtful that these
conditions could be met. One need only point to the Dutch experience
to be convinced of the merits of the slippery slope argument even it its
empirical fonn.4 Partisans of this view seem willing to admit that some
people's lives can be judged not to be a "benefit" or even to be harmful
to them but argue on utilitarian grounds that such a benefit ought not to
be legally available. And so the law ought to treat everyone as if they
were equal in human dignity when in fact they are not.
4) Besides the concern that legalized voluntary euthanasia will pass
over into nonvoluntary euthanasia, there is also the worry that
"vulnera6le peop e - the ehterly;-Ionely, sick-or- d-ist..essed--,,--wo-uldfeel pressure, whether real or imagined, to request early death."
(section 239)
5) As for the fear some patients have of "aggressive medical
treatment beyond the point at which the individual felt that
continued life was no longer a benefit but a burden" (Section 240),
there is now a "steadily emerging" consensus that "life-prolonging
treatment may be withdrawn or not initiated." (ibid)
The Committee is not referring here to the well-known (if not
always properly understood) principle that futile or excessively
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burdensome treatment is not morally required. Instead it seems to be
saying that although a person who feels his life is "no longer a benefit
but a burden" ought not to be actively killed he ought to be allowed,Jor
that very reason, to die. This clearly implies that the Committee thinks'
that the law oUght to go along with such a person's self-estimate and
that passive euthanasia, unlike active euthanasia, for some unstated
reason does not violate the principle of equality in his case. In this way
the Committee, as Luke Gormally points out in Chapter 10 of
Euthanasia Examined, left untouched "the intellectually incoherent
condition of the English law of homicide following the Bland
judgement." (124) In that case, the Court agreed that "discontinuing all
life sustaining and medical support measures designed to keep Anthony
Bland alive" involved "the intention of bringing about Anthony Bland's
death" but that it did not represent a case of murder since the doctor
was under no duty to continue feeding because the feeding was medical
treatment which was not in the patient's best interests. And that was so
because "a responsible body of medical opinion did not regard
existence in Tony Bland's condition as a benefit." (121)5 This means
that as matters stand, the law in England (and elsewhere) is saying yes
and no to nonvoluntary euthanasia - you can't intentionally kill by a
positive act but you can by omission. The Walton Committee does not
explicitly recommend intentional nonvoluntary euthanasia but only
because the Committee's stipulative definition of euthanasia in Section
20 allows it to evade the reality of intentional killing by omission. Still
it allows a principle to be introduced into the law according to which
some people's lives may be judged, either by themselves or by a
"responsible body of medical opinion", not to be a "benefit" or to be "in
their best interests". Had Tony Bland written an advance directive6
expressing "refusal of any treatment or procedure which would require
the consent of the patient if competent" (Section 263) the Committee
would allow this as a legitimate exercise of personal autonomy. But,
more than this, it provides no logical grounds for refusing such a
"benefit" even to noncompetent patients who leave no "living wills".
Gormally points out that the Commission is similarly blind to the
reality of suicide by planned omission. The Report strongly endorses
"the right of the competent patient to refuse consent to any medical
treatment, for whatever reason". (Section 234) There is not sufficient
recognition in the Report of the unlawfulness, ifnot the criminality, of
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suicide.
Doctors who practice passive nonvoluntary euthanasia on the
noncompetent such as Tony Bland are only too happy to point to those
ethicists and judges who, with logical inconsistency, think it wrong to
actively kill those whom they think devoid of any meaningful life but
right to kill them by omission. Thus, Bryan Jennett (See Chapter 12 of
Euthanasia Examined) points to the Bland case where "the judges
emphasized, as had several US judges before them, that a decision to
allow withdrawal of life support from a vegetative patient has nothing
to do with euthanasia." (169) Jennett maintains that "the decision to let
a vegetative patient die by withdrawing tube-feeding is a logical
extension of what has become a widely accepted medical practice that
is supported by ethicists and is not challenged by lawyers - namely the
withholding or withdrawal of treatment considered of no benefit to a
patient and therefOic not in his best interests." (170) Naturally Jennett,
like his Dutch colleagues, uses "euthanasia" to mean "an active
intervention intended to bring about the death of the patient". (170) He
seems to see a morally significant distinction between this and omitting
treatment with the same intent, viz., to bring an end to "a life devoid of
almost all the attributes of a human being ... " (179) Those who think
that "life of any kind is in itself a benefit" are branded "vitalists".
(ibid.) Jennett puts himself on the side of what he considers a majority
of people in Western countries who "believe that prolonging life in a
vegetative state is not a benefit." (ibid)7
6) "[TJhe pain and distress of terminal illness can be adequately
relieved in the vast majority of cases" (Section 241) by palliative
care.
7) In the "small and diminishing number of cases in which pain
and oistress cannoC l>e satisfactorily controlled", analgesi~ ..- - sedative drugs in increasing doses may be given to relieve pain or
distress. These may shorten life but if they are given "with no
intention to kill" and "in accordance with responsible medical
practice with the objective of relieving pain or distress" (Section
242) they may be justified.
The preceding seven propositions seem to represent the
prevailing wisdom in the matter of euthanasia and its legislation. For
many they represent a "moderate" view that avoids the extreme
positions of those who, on the one hand, wish to have voluntary active
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and passive euthanasia decriminalized and of those who, on the other
hand, wish to see it subject to criminal sanctions. Of course, this
"moderate" position will be seen as inadequate by those at either socalled extreme. At bottom, what is at stake here is one's ethical
position on euthanasia and how the law ought to reflect one's moral
position. More fundamentally, what is at stake is one's whole way of
thinking of moral and legal issues generally as well as one's
understanding of the human person whose rights it is the job of ethics
to discern and the role of law to protect.
Some of these foundational issues are studied in the first six
chapters of Euthanasia Examined. John Harris (Professor of Applied
Philosophy in the University of Manchester) and John Finnis (Professor
of Law and Legal Philosophy in the University of Oxford) have at each
other over the moral permissibility of voluntary euthanasia. 8
Differences between the two appear already at the level of the definition
of euthanasia and this difference is closely connected to philosophical
disagreements which go beyond the particular moral issue of
euthanasia. Finnis and Harris have different philosophies of action,
different philosophical anthropologies, and different ethical and
metaethical theories.
Harris defines euthanasia as the "decision that a life will end
when it could be prolonged"(6). Finnis's definition is significantly
different since it links the decision, not just to the event of death, but to
the intention and action of killing. A person who engages in euthanasia
decides to kill that person at that person's request (if it is voluntary
euthanasia) on the ground or for the reason "that one's human life in
certain conditions or circumstances retains no intrinsic value or dignity,
or on balance no net value, so that one's life is not worth living and one
would be better off dead" or "that the world will be a better place if
one's life were intentionally terminated." (70) Finnis carefully
distinguishes euthanasia as the intentional killing of another person
(whether by commission or omission) from 1) the use of drugs which
cause death as a side effect; 2) longing for death; and 3) decisions to
decline life-saving or life-sustaining forms of treatment because they
choose to avoid the burdens (v.g. pain, disfigurement, expense)
imposed by such treatment, and accept the earlier onset of their death
as a side effect of that choice.
Harris cannot agree with Finnis's understanding of the moral
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significance of intention and argues that "we are also and equally
responsible for the things we, voluntarily, bring about, for the things
that are the consequences of our free choice ... " (36-37). Finnis agrees
that we are often gravely responsible for what he calls the side effects
(Harris prefers "consequences") of what we do. However, he maintains
that our responsibility for them is governed by moral norms different
from those applicable to our intending and choosing ends and means.
He would grant that a person who drinks excessively is responsible not
only for getting drunk but also for the hangover or liver disease which
was consequent upon getting drunk. But he would not draw Harris's
conclusion that he chose not only to get drunk but also the hangover
and the liver disease and that he is therefore equally responsible for
both. Harris is led by such an analysis to conclude that when
Parliament, for example, chooses to spend funds on education which
might have been spent on life-saving surgery it is choosing and
implementing a program of euthanasia (53, 54). On his analysis
Parliament makes two choices - to spend money on education and (by
omission) to kill people. It may intend only to spend funds on
educ,a tion. But that is not what is morally significant. Moral
significance attaches to choice and, according to him, the choice is both
to spend funds on education and (by omission) to end the lives of
certain people.
That is why Harris sees no morally significant difference in the
distinction drawn by Finnis between "choosing to kill someone with
drugs .. .in order to relieve them of their pain and suffering, and choosing
to relieve someone of their pain by giving drugs, in a dosage
determined by the drugs' capacity for pain relief, foreseeing that the
drugs in that dosage will cause death in say three days." According to
Harris "in each case the drugs have-been-administered to controLpain
and to bring about the death which will permanently end irremediable
suffering ..." (38) In another context, a person who knowingly causes
his own death as the result of an action that is meant or intended to save
someone else's life is equally responsible for the lives saved and the life
(his own) lost. His action could be accurately described as one of
choosing to kill oneself (suicide) knowing that others would live or in
order that others may live. Harris's analysis is consistent with the view
that Jesus's and Thomas More's and Maximilian Kolbe's sacrifices of
their lives were in fact noble acts of suicide. The reason is that we are
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"responsible for the whole package of consequences We know will
result from the choices we make. We cannot...evade responsibility by
only narrowly intending some of the consequences of our choices. We
are responsible for the consequences of our choices because we know
the sorts of world these consequences will help shape." (40) What
counts is not whether or not someone's death should be intended or
merely foreseen as a consequence but "whether or not this death is
morally permissible in these circumstances however caused". (39) As
Finnis points out, this amounts to determining not whether killing is
wrong but whether first and foremost the person's life is worth living
or not, or at least whether the person's life has net worth, all things
considered.
Harris and Finnis are also at odds regarding the nature and value
of the human person. Harris defines a person as a "creature capable of
valuing its own existence." (9) It is not human life or membership in
the biological species homo sapiens that is special. There are many
human beings who are not persons since they are not capable of valuing
their existence, v.g., the human embryo or the newborn infant (9) and
there are many human beings who have ceased to be persons, v.g.,
people in a persistent vegetative state because they have lost their
capacity to value their existence. For all that, Harris denies that he is
a dualist. In PVS the body, as in death, has ceased to be the body of a
person. "It is a living human body (as in a sense it often is when brain
death is diagnosed on a life-support system - it is warm, the blood
circulates and so on, but it is not the living human body of a
person. "(42)9
Also, valuing one's life is not to be understood as recognizing
a value that one's (and, presumably, by extension another's) life has
independently of one's evaluation of it as such. Harris quite explicitly
adopts a Sartrean metaethics of value: "The value of our lives is the
value we give to our lives. And we do this, so far as this is possible at
all, by shaping our lives for ourselves." (II) On this conception, our
bodily being, our life, is simply raw material that must be formed or
"shaped" by our choices. Without the will's bestowal of value, the
human body has no personal meaning whatsoever. It is the imprint on
it of our autonomous will that gives "to each life its own special and
peculiar value." (11)
Respect for persons, according to Harris, comes down to respect
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for their autonomy, for their ability to create their own lives out of
competing conceptions of how and why to live. Concern for people's
welfare, or concern for the intrinsic value of life, or respect for "critical
interests" must be (if it is not to degenerate into paternalism) either
subordinate to or reducible to respect for their wishes to create their
own lives for themselves. My welfare, my value, my critical interests
are tantamount to "[my] own conviction as to what is in [my] critical
interests" (15) or "opinions about what it means for [my] life to go
well." (16)
Finnis has a quite different understanding of the human person
and of his value. For him, a human being does not become (or cease to
be) a person when it has acquired (or lost) the immediate capacity to be
self-conscious or to choose or to value life. A human being in its early
stages is not a potential person that becomes an actual person when it
acquires the immediate capacity to think and choose and speak, etc.,
any more than a human being in its early stages is a potential animal
which becomes an actual animal when it acquires the immediate
capacity to see, hear, smell, feel pain, etc. From the start the human
being is a person in virtue of its radical capacity as the kind of being it
is to develop over time its biological, psychological and intellectual
volitional structures and their attendant abilities. The radical capacity
characteristic of the human embryo is not the mere passive capacity of
materials that can be whipped into shape either by the environment or
by human intelligence. Nor is it like the more proximate but still
passive capacity of sperm/ovum to become a zygote human being. By
itself neither a sperm nor an ovum ever develops to become a fetus,
infant, child, etc. Nor does the development of any living thing have
an analogue in the technical world of human making. The early stages
ofuny-living-thing-are-neither-bluepri-nts flor-building materials-Bricks._ __
'1
do not develop into houses and blueprints remain external to the
finished product. It makes sense to see the development from zygote
or embryo to fetus to infant in the same light as the development of
infant to child to adolescent to adult. An infant and adolescent are
potential adults, but they are not potential human beings or persons.
And so the zygote or embryo is a potential infant and child and
adolescent, etc., but they are not potential human beings or persons.
All of these are stages in the biography of one being - the human being
or person. So when Finnis says that the human embryo is capable of
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v.g. valuing he is saying that it has "a nature of the kind whose
flourishing involves such valuing, whether or not an individual or (sic)
such a nature happens to be in a position to exercise those capacities."
(48) In that sense, then, "every living human being has this radical
capacity for participating in the manner of a person - intelligently and
freely - in human goods." (41) Any non-dualistic account of the human
person must view one's humanity as one's radical capacity "for human
metabolism, human awareness, feelings, imagination, memory,
responsiveness and sexuality, and human wondering, relating and
communicating, deliberating, choosing and acting." (31) These quite
different activities, including the intellectual volitional are all
specifically human. They represent the flourishing of the singular
identical human being that began to unfold autonomously from the
moment of conception. As Finnis says:
...the human being's life is not a vegetable life supplemented by
an animal life supplemented by an intellectual life; it is the one
life ofa unitary being. So a being that once has human (and thus
personal) life will remain a human person while that life (the
dynamic principle for that being's integral organic functioning)
remains -Le. until death. Where one's brain has not yet
developed, or has been so damaged as to impair or even destroy
one's capacity for intellectual acts, one is an immature or
damaged human person." (3 1)

Of course, it is a human being's radical capacity to think and deliberate
and choose that allows us to speak of it as a person. Still human bodily
life is not "mere habituation, platform or instrument for the human
person or spirit. "(32)
Human bodily life is essentially the life of a person. A human
person cannot be distinguished, let alone separated, from human bodily
life. It follows that human bodily life is an intrinsic and basic personal
good. Whereas in Harris's view (and, it would appear, in that of the
medical ethics establishment) human life is not a good or value
independently of the creative human will which alone is good and
decrees what is good elsewhere 1o, in Finnis's "Sanctity of Human Life"
ethics human life is a good or value independently of the creative
human will. According to Harris, people are wronged by being killed
only if they are thereby deprived of something they value. Only if their
lives are lent a value by their creative wills do they deserve respect. For
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Harris, suicide and voluntary euthanasia are simply the individual's
attempt to create his own life by creating its ending also. (11)11 Finnis
and others in this volume present another consideration. It is this: both
the person who asks for and the one who assists (in assisted suicide) or
does the actual killing (in euthanasia) must proceed on one or both of
two philosophically and morally erroneous judgements that has serious
implications for others: 1) that human life in certain conditions or
circumstances retains no intrinsic value and dignity (or as he makes
more precise later on [70] no net value), so that one's life is not worth
living and one would be better off dead or 2) that the world would be
a better place if one's life were intentionally terminated. "I want to die!
My life is worthless!" says the patient. "I agree! Your life is indeed
worthless! You are right to want an end to it!" says, at least implicitly,
the doctor (or whoever). But these judgements (whether true or false)
cannot be limited to one's own case and circumstances. For example,
the first judgement claims that death is no harm (indeed may be a
benefit) and that being killed is no wrong. So it cannot in logic rule out
non-voluntary and even involuntary euthanasia. The same holds for the
second judgement. 12
Although Finnis belongs to the so-called Sanctity of Human
Life ethical human tradition and rules out as always morally wrong the
intentional killing of innocent people, he is not a vitalist if by that is
meant someone who thinks that there are no limits in one's obligation
to prolong human life. There is, of course, a positive obligation to
prolong human life, but like all positive obligations, there are limits.
Thus, while it is wrong to intentionally kill people in PVS (either by
commission or omission), the care to be provided them need be no
more than is provided to anyone and everyone for whom one has any
respect and responsioility - the food, water anu-deaning-that one GaR.
provide at home. To do otherwise would manifest a choice to proceed
on the basis that such persons are better off dead - that their lives are
not equal in value and worth with that of everyone else's and that they
do not have an equal right to life. (33)13
In chapter 7 Kenneth Boyd, without a trace of rational argument
or sense of ambiguity, tells us that he accepts "that there are some
rational suicides, and by extension that some requests for euthanasia are
also rational." (78) He means, I believe, that some requests for suicide
and euthanasia are not only made by sane people but are also ethically
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justified, although he offers no argument for either. His "modest"
proposal is that a way be found for determining whether or not a
particular request can be justified - a conversational method that
supposedly addresses the singular, individual, unique person and his
circumstances. In her case for legalizing voluntary euthanasia in
Chapter 8, Jean Davies tells us that public opinion (including that of the
religiously affiliated), the increased importance of personal autonomy,
the demographic factor of our aging population and the continuing
development of medical technology for "extending our dying" all point
in the direction of changing the law against voluntary euthanasia.
Davies would like to see the "sanctity of human life" principle replaced
by the "respect for human life" principle as long as one distinguishes
between "being alive and having a life". She cites Lord Justice
Hoffman's judgement: "the stark reality is that Anthony Bland is not
living a life at all." (88) As for the advances made by the hospice
movement, Davies thinks that "there are still many people who do not
want to go on to the bitter end and do not see why that should be
required of them." (ibid) Davies would welcome the legalization of
assisted suicide as a first step towards the decriminalization of
"properly practised" (89) voluntary euthanasia.
In this connection she points to the "guidelines" for what she
considers to be the "careful practice" of euthanasia in the Netherlands.
Two of the most important provisos are the explicit and deliberate
request for euthanasia on the part of the patient and the check by a
second doctor of diagnosis and patient's refusal of further lifeprolonging treatment. She dismisses out of hand the "barrage of illinformed criticism" leveled at Dutch euthanasia practice. 14
Against Davies, Luke Gormally argues 15 with Finnis and Keown
that "what bears the main weight of justifying voluntary euthanasia
[viz. that death is a benefit for a person who no longer has a worthwhile
life] also justifies non-voluntary euthanasia." (127)
And so the
voluntary euthanasia movement cannot dissociate itself from the Nazi
practice of euthanasia. Their reason to justify (versus their motive) for
killing the mentally ill, the handicapped, retarded and deformed
children was that their lives were "not worth living" or were "devoid of
value". (128)
Gormally rejects the reigning view in medical ethics (defended,
for example, by Harris) that "the value and dignity associated with the
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possession of basic human rights depends upon human beings first
developing psychological abilities which they retain as presently
exercisable abilities" in favor of the view (defended, for example, by
Finnis) that "every hUman being - simply in virtue of being human - has
the dignity and value recognition of which entails acknowledgement of
their basic human rights." (115)
This equality-in-dignity of human beings is also the
fundamental reason for maintaining criminal sanctions on aiding and
abetting suicide as well as on euthanasia. A would-be suicide is clearly
persuaded that life is no longer worth living. But the law, consistent
with its moral foundation, cannot go along with that self-estimate or
with the attitude of those who aid and abet suicide and who, in doing
so, "in effect tell the would-be suicide that his life is indeed without
value." (116) It is sometimes said that since suicide is "legal" then so
ought assistance in suicide at least for those who are unable to do the
deadly thing themselves. However, in decriminalizing attempted
suicide legislators make the prudential judgement that life is better
served if would-be suicides got help. To prosecute such people would
undermine their prospects of recovering some sense of the
worthwhileness of their lives. It would also most likely increase the
number of successful attempts at suicide. As for euthanasia, the
fundamental objection to it and to its legislation is an "objection to
aiming to cause someone's death in order to put an end to a life judged
no longer worthwhile." (116) Gormally rejects the grossly inflated
claims of autonomy or choice. Human flourishing, of course, "requires
that I make choices, that what I do is my doing, and what I achieve my
achievement." There must also be some scope for erroneous choices.
However, there are "no general grounds for respecting every kind of
s-elf--[arrd-one-couJd-add: other-] destructi-ve e-flG-ic€.-.." (119~_
In Chapter 11, Robert G. Twycross, who has worked as a .
hospice doctor for over 20 years, claims that "it would be a disaster for
the medical profession to cross the Rubicon and use pharmacological
means to precipitate death intentionally." (164) In his work he
considers himself bound "by the cardinal ethical principle that I must
achieve my treatment goal with the least risk to the patient's life." Even
in extreme and rare circumstances, his "intention is to alleviate
suffering, not to shorten life." (166)
In his article (Chapter 15) Yale Kamisar seeks to hold the legal
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line between letting die, on the one hand, and direct killing and assisted
suicide on the other. He claims that the Supreme Court decisions in the
U.S. lend no support to the right to assisted suicide. Kamisar
personally thinks that a person has a moral right in certain
circumstances to commit suicide (as well as to assisted suicide and
euthanasia) but he argues on utilitarian lines that assisted suicide should
not be legalized. Moreover, legalizing assisted suicide would surely
open the way to the legalization of voluntary euthanasia. Kamisar sees
the logical connections between assisted suicide for the terminally ill
and assisted suicide for other seriously ill or disabled persons (who may
have to endure more pain and suffering for a much longer period of
time). He also sees the logical connections between assisted suicide
and voluntary euthanasia. Although he does not see the logical
connection between the ethical foundations of voluntary and
nonvoluntary euthanasia, the empirical connection between the practice
of voluntary and nonvoluntary euthanasia is sufficient to convince him
that voluntary euthanasia (and its logical counterpart assisted suicide)
should not be legalized. 16
The final chapter by Anthony Fisher is a scriptural theological
reflection on euthanasia. In that perspective, the two radical sides of
the euthanasia debate seem to pit the old self-willed Adam against the
new Adam sent to do the will of His Father. The temptation to become
as the gods, to think of oneself as creating good and evil by one's
autonomous will (Nietzsche) or choice (Sartre) seems very much alive
among those who clamor for liberalization of the law in the matter of
euthanasia. This religious ethical world view contrasts radically with
the religious ethical world view of those who claim the second Adam
as their model and who believe (not unreasonably) with Saint Paul that
we are not our "own", that we "belong to Christ". The followers of
Christ have to stand up to the Caiphases and Pilates of our age who
wish to wash their hands clean of innocent human life.
-John Hartley
Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto
(Retired)
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provided to any patient in PVS. "The condition itself and the essential requirements
for caring for people who suffer from it are not sufficient to show either that
withdrawing food and water is permissible or required or that continuing to provide
them is required". (198) The relevant moral rule is that "we must do what we can to
care for patients in PVS, and to maintain the human ties with them which show our
respect for their human dignity". This means that "a level of care which can be
provided compatibly with other responsibilities is morally required". Needless to say,
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Boyle comes out of a framework of moral and anthropological thinking that is foreign
to Jennett. We shall have much to say about this later.

}

8. Chapters 8, 9, and to of Euthanasia Examined speak to how the law ought to
address the specific moral issue of euthanasia. Gormally's chapter (10) is the most
philosophically grounded of these essays. It contains a sketch and defense of the
moral principle that ought to inform the law on euthanasia (and other human life
issues).
9. Harris makes no distinction between an organically whole living human body with
its vital functions and functioning and a body that has ceased to function as an organic
whole but which nonetheless contains parts which function in isolation often only with
the help of a machine.
10. Harris does not explain how euthanasia is compatible with respect for the valuing
self given that when the evaluated life is destroyed the valuing selfis destroyed as
well. How is deliberate destruction of what is of "intrinsic, cosmic importance" (16)
compatible with respect for it?
II . What if I should decide to de-value the lives of other human beings? Harris does
not appear to be able to exclude murder in that situation. He might perhaps counter
that what counts is not my valuation of other peoples' lives but their own autonomous
valuing. But why should I and my autonomous will respect the autonomous valuing
of others? Harris does not explain why I, who am ex hypothesi the creator of values,
should value positively the value projects of others. Harris plays down the
implications for others of his view that "[p]ersons who do not want to live are not on
this account wronged by having this wish granted, through voluntary euthanasia for
example". (9) To be sure, it is consistent with Harris's understanding of personhood
and value that "[n]on-persons or potential persons [v.g. fetuses, infants, patient in
PVS] cannot be wronged in this way because death does not deprive them of anything
they can value. If they cannot have that wish to live, they cannot have that wish
frustrated by being killed" . (9) But do people whom even Harris would consider
genuine persons (viz. those who can wish or not to live) escape the logic of his
position? In other words, can Harris's view rule out non-voluntary and even
involuntary euthanasia? The considerations above suggest that he cannot.

"

12. This argument goes beyond the "empirical" slippery slope argument (of which
more later) in terms of what is likely to happen if we approve ethically or legally
assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia.
13. See note 5.
14. Hopefully Davies will read the carefully researched article of John Keown, the
editor of Euthanasia Examined, on Dutch euthanasia practice. He fmds "ample
evidence from the Dutch experience to substantiate the relevance of the 'slippery
slope' argument in both its forms." (263) The logical form of the argument runs that
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the acceptance of voluntary euthanasia leads to acceptance of at least nonvoluntary
euthanasia because the former rests on the judgement that some lives are not "worth"
living, which judgement can logically be made even if the patient is incapable of
requesting euthanasia. If a doctor can make this judgement in relation to an
autonomous patient he can, logically, make it in relation to an incompetent patient.
And if death is a "benefit" for a competent patient suffering certain conditions, why
should it be denied incompetent patients suffering from similar conditions? Keown
shows that there were far more cases of non voluntary euthanasia in Holland in 1990
than of voluntary euthanasia partly because "the underlying justification for euthanasia
in Holland appears not to be patient self-determination, but rather acceptance of the
principle that certain lives are not 'worth' living and that it is right to terminate them."
(287) The empirical form of the argument runs that even if a line can in principle be
drawn between voluntary and nonvoluntary euthanasia, a slide will occur in practice
because the safeguards to prevent it cannot be made effective. In the Dutch case
" ...the Guidelines are simply incapable, because of their vagueness and the fact that
they entrust the decision-making to the individual practitioner, of ensuring that
euthanasia is carried out only in accordance with the criteria they [the courts and The
Royal Dutch Association] specity." (266) The Survey done for the Remmelink
Commission shows that doctors intended to accelerate death in far more that the 2,700
cases classified by the Commission as "euthanasia" and assisted suicide. "This total
ignores the 1000 cases of intentional killing without request and, in addition, three
further categories where there is said to have been some intention to shorten life: first,
the 8,100 ... cases of increasing the dosage of palliative drugs; secondly, the 8,750
cases of withholding or withdrawing treatment without request and, fmally, the
5,800 ... cases of withholding or withdrawing treatment on request. Adding these 23,
650 cases to the 2,700 produces a total of26, 350 cases in which the Survey states that
doctors intended, by act or omission, to shorten life. This raises the incidence of
euthanasia from around 2% to over 20% of all deaths in Holland." (217) And let it
be noted that 15, 258 or 57.9% of these deaths were nonvoluntary. The Commission
seeks to defend the 1,000 cases of nonvoluntary euthanasia it admits by stating that
"active intervention" was usually "inevitable" because of the patient's "death agony" .
(276) As Keown notes, this attempted ethical justification amounts to little more than
a bare assertion that killing without request is morally acceptable.
15. See Chapter 10 - Walton, Davies, Boyd ana the legalization ofeuthanasia-;16. Dieter Giesen's article in Chapter 14, "Dilemmas at Life's End: A Comparative
Legal Perspective", is useful for its legal scholarship. However, he does not appear
up to the ethical status quaestionis. Here he appears eclectic rather than systematic
and analytic in his approach.
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